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Abstract—Recently, ultra-dense low earth orbit (LEO) satellite
constellation over high-frequency bands has considered as one of
promising solutions to supply coverage all over the world. Given
satellite constellations, efficient beam coverage schemes should be
employed at satellites to provide seamless services and full-view
coverage. In LEO systems, hybrid wide and spot beam coverage
schemes are generally used, where the LEO provides a wide
beam for large area coverage and additional several steering spot
beams for high speed data access. In this given setting, scheduling
multiple spot beams is essentially required. In order to achieve
this goal, Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction-based trustful
algorithm is proposed in this paper for scheduling multiple spot
beams for more efficient seamless services and full-view coverage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even though communication and networking technologies
are rapidly developing, there is still a long way to go to connect
any users at any times in any places. According to the fact
that satellite communications have abundant radio frequency
resources, large coverage areas, long communication distance,
fast deployment, and less interference from the ground net-
works are available [1]. The satellite communications have
attracted a lot of attention to provide global coverage and
satisfy the deficiency of internet access. Due to the distance
between the satellite and the surface of the earth, the satellite
communications can be classified into geostationary earth orbit
(GEO), medium earth orbit (MEO), and low earth orbit (LEO)
satellite systems [1], [2]. Different form GEO and MEO, LEO
satellites are usually located at orbits with altitude from 500
to 2, 000 km. Because of the relatively lower latency and path
loss, the production and launching costs of LEO are very
attractive. To supply worldwide coverage via LEO satellites,
we propose a novel hybrid wide and spot beam coverage
control scheme is proposed in this paper [1], [3].
The main idea of the hybrid wide-and-spot beam coverage
control is that each LEO satellite provides a wide beam for
the total service area as well as several steering spot beams
for specific scheduled user terminals. The spot beams are
always steered to the users, so its trajectory is fixed during the
movement of satellite. The power allocation of a spot beam
is designed to be much higher than that of the wide beam
because the spot beam has to work for modulation/coding
techniques to send data to its scheduled user terminals. While
a hybrid wide and spot beam coverage control scheme is used,
there is a resource allocation problem among user terminals
and spot beams [1], In general, the number of user terminals
demanding data resource allocation is more than the number of
available spot beams. In this system, a network management
center (NMC) which performs resource allocation strategies
of the entire network by collecting the traffic data of users
and LEO satellites has to effectively allocate spot beams to
user terminals. In this paper, a resource assignment method
has been proposed that is inspired by the auction which
guarantees optimal total utility of the system as well as
truthful operations [4]–[7]. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
auction, one of the well-known auction algorithms, is used
in this paper because it supposed to be a sealed-bid auction
that ensures trustful auctions and guarantees trustful spot beam
allocation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
presents the details of the proposed auction-based hybrid wide-
and-spot beam scheduling and coverage control algorithm.
Sec. III evaluates the performance of the proposed algorithm.
Lastly, Sec. IV concludes this paper and presents future
research directions.
II. AUCTION-BASED HYBRID WIDE/SPOT BEAM
SCHEDULING AND COVERAGE CONTROL
The proposed auction-based hybrid beam scheduling algo-
rithm works based on following three-step procedure.
A. (Step 1) Auction Setting and Formulation
The deployed user terminals in the network system ul-
timately send their gathered data demand to NMC. NMC
calculates the resource allocation among the spot beams and
user terminals. As LEO orbits regularly, it is possible to predict
spot beams that can be available during given time periods.
Note that the future available spot beams are named to FASBs
in this paper. Then, FASBs become auctioneers (also called
seller) in VCG auction. When the user terminal (the bidders)
collect the total data demand rate of the surrounding network,
we subtract the total data demand rate from the spot beam’s
maximum data capacity to measure the spare amount of each
spot beam selection data capacity (SBSDC). We can measure
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the effectiveness of allocation by SBSDC. When SBSDC (i.e.,
bid) is low, the allocation is regarded as well designed. NMC
allocates spot beams to user terminals through an auction
mechanism. Although the same user terminals bid to get
radio resources from FASBs, user terminals bid differently to
each spot beams due to different time, each FASB becomes
available.
In order to formulate the auction mechanism for winning bid
determination can based on the definitions as follows. First of
all, the M number of user terminals (bidder) is denoted by
U , {u1, u2, · · · , uM} , (1)
and N number of FASBs (auctioneer) is also denoted by
S , {s1, s2, · · · , sN} , (2)
and lastly, the spare amount of each spot beam data capacity
(i.e., bid) is similarly denoted by
B , {b1M , b2M , · · · , bNM} . (3)
Then, our mathematical optimization can be formulate as
follows.
min :
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
xji b
j
i (4)
subject to
N∑
j=1
xji ≤ 1,∀ui,j ∈ U (5)
M∑
i=1
xji ≤ 1,∀si,j ∈ S (6)
B. (Step 2) Winning Bid Determination
For winning bid determination, the proposed scheme uses
the Hungarian method [4]. The Hungarian method is one of
well-known methods for finding a one-to-one matching that
meets the minimum bid in the n × n matrix. Since the bid
matrix is not a square matrix, the NMC needs to modify the
bid matrix to used this Hungarian method. NMC can create a
bid matrix of M×N for each time. In this case, if M > N , it
cannot directly use the Hungarian method. The pre-processing
for making n× n matrix can be completed via the following
steps.
1) NMC gj creates a bid matrix of M ×N with B.
2) If M > N , add the columns from L+1 to N to construct
an M ×N matrix.
3) Set any positive integer Z greater than any bids for an
element of (1: M , N+1: M ).
4) After generating a matrix of M ×M , find the minimum
total bid and matching through the Hungarian method.
5) Subtract Z × (M − (N + 1)) from the total bid and
excluding the device matched with the N + 1 to M -th
column.
C. (Step 3) Payment Determination
According to the basic theory of VCG auction, the payment
for winning bid is determined by the concept of opportunity
cost [6], [7]. The opportunity cost in this system can be deter-
mined by CB and CB\{bji} where CB stands for the summation
of determined winning bids by NMC. In addition, CB\{bji}
stands for the minimum total cost which is determined by
winning bid determination (in Step 2) except bji . For example,
if bji is a winning bid, it is true that CB\{bji} > CB. On the
other hand, i.e., if bji is not a winning bid, CB = CB\{bji}.
Note that CB − xji bji is the total cost (determined by winning
bid) except its own bid. The payment (i.e., opportunity cost)
pji can be defined as the difference between CB\{bki,j} and
CB − xji bji [8]; and thus its mathematical model should be
expressed as follows:
pji = CB\{bji} −
(
CB − xji bji
)
. (7)
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Fig. 1: comparative graph of VCG and greedy mechanism
In Fig. 1, x-axis and y-axis denotes the number of FASBs
that must be assigned to the user terminals and the average
SBSDC for spot beams, respectively. In general, one spot
beam provides data at hundreds of megabits/s. As presented
in Fig. 1, the average of 150 megabits/s is assumed as the
maximum transmission capacity of each spot beam. VCG
auction mechanism uses SBSDCs as bids to find a combination
that seeks a minimum total value as mentioned earlier and
assigns spot beams to user terminals. Comparatively, the
greedy method is to allocate the spot beam by selecting the
user terminal that presents the smallest SBSDC whenever a
new assignable FASB occurs. The lower values in SBSDC
(i.e., y-axis value), the more efficient scheduling between the
spot beam and the user terminal can be realized. Therefore,
we can confirm that VCG auction is more efficient than the
greedy method. The reason why the assignable spot beams of
two and three produce the same graph values in both policies
is that the small number of assignable spot beams results in the
same allocation results in the Hungarian and greedy policies.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes a novel hybrid wide-and-spot beam
scheduling for LEO satellite coverage control algorithm in-
spired by VCG auction mechanism. By using the VCG
auction, truthful and optimized scheduling for hybrid wide-
and-spot beam scheduling can be realized in LEO satellite
networks. As presented in performance evaluation results, our
proposed algorithm achieves desired performance.
Our potential future work directions include (i) more re-
alistic satellite environment consideration, (ii) more specific
system-wide operation definition, and (iii) more specific and
data-intensive performance evaluation.
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